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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE C. LEWIS and 
VERONA D. LEWIS 
Plantiffs and Appellants 
vs 
CLARA A. WHITE and 
KATHRYN WHITE 
Defendants and Respondents 
Civil No. 7807 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Ia w suit arises out of a con tract dated May 
1, 1949, (Exhibit ''A") wherein the Appellants 
agreed to sell and convey a Motel near Pleasant Grove, 
Utah, to the Respondents. Prior to the execution of 
the contract the Appellant, Clyde C. Lewis, went to 
Farmington, Utah, where the Respondents then lived, 
and had two conversations with them. Upon the first 
occasion he went with a Mr. Chidester, a real estate 
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man, and on the second time he was accompanied by 
Mrs. Lewis, the other Appellant (Tr. 47). Before 
the contract \vas signed Respondents went to Pleasant 
Grove and inspected the motel property, made inquiry 
concerning the income therefrom and were shown 
around by Mr. Lyons, who was in charge of the pro-
perty for the Appellants. The Respondents saw the 
motel property on Saturday before Easter and again 
on Easter Sunday, 1949, which in that year was on 
the 17th of April (Tr. 317 and 111). Respondents 
took possession of the property on Sunday, May 1, 
1949 (Tr. 322). Some payments were made on the 
contract, but Respondents became delinquent in their 
payments, and in May, 1950, the Appellants exercised 
their rights under the contract by reason of the de-
fault of the Respondents and caused a notice of evic-
tion to be served upon Respondents (Tr.107 and 116). 
After termination of the contract and receiving the 
notice of eviction, negotiations were had between the 
parties which resulted in reinstating the contract by 
payment of a sum in excess of One Thousand Six 
Hundred and· no/100 ( $1,600.00) Dollars by Re-
spondents ( Tr. 116) . Thereafter the Respondents 
again became in default. Another notice of termina-
tion of contract was served on August, 17, 1950, at 
which time they were in default on the contract in the 
sum of One Thousand Seventy Eight and 36/100 
($1,078.36) Dollars (Tr. 8). This action to recover 
possession of the premises was commenced on the 17th 
day of October, 1950 (R. 3). An Answer was filed 
on the 17th day of November, 1950 (R. 5) and on the 
26th day of March, 1951 (R. 10) an Amended An-
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swer and Counter Claim were filed wherein Respond-
ents claimed damages for alleged false representa-
tions with respect to insulation, sewage and income 
of the motel property, which allegations Appellants 
denied in their reply. 
The case was tried before the Honorable R. L. 
Tucket and a Jury during the week of September 24, 
1951. A special verdict was submitted to the jury 
who found in favor of the Respondents on the Counter 
Claim ( R. 34) . After the verdict had been returned 
the Respondents offered to vacate the premises and 
expressed a willingness to permit the treble damages 
arising from unlawful detainer to be deducted from 
the amount of damages on the Counter Claim (Tr. 
410). The Court entered Findings and Judgment 
accordingly (R. 36-41). The Appellants have ap-
pealed from that portion of the judgment against 
them in the sum of Twenty Three Thousand Six Hun-
dred F·orty Two and 04/100 ( $23,642.04) Dollars 
(R. 44). 
STATE.MENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. RESPONDENTS FAILED TO 
PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
WITH RESPECT TO THE REPRE-
SENTATIONS. 
POINT II. RESPONDENTS DID NOT RELY 
UPON THE REPRESENTATIONS 
CLAIMED. 
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POINT III. RESPONDENTS HAD NO RIGHT 
TO RELY UPON THE REPRESEN-
TATIONS CLAIMED. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
lNG TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON 
RIGHT TO RELY. 
POINT V. THE FINDING OF THE JURY 
THAT THE VALUE OF THE MO-
TEL PROPERTY WAS $42,000.00, 
HAD IT BEEN ·AS REPRESENT-
ED, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
POINT VI. RESPONDENTS WAIVED ANY 
ACTION FOR FRAUD. 
ARGUMEN'T 
POINT I. RESPONDENTS FAILED TO 
PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
WITH RESPECT TO THE AL-
LEGED REPRESENTATIONS. 
f The Respondents claim false representations 
with respect to the insulation, sewer and income of 
the motel property ( R. 10). The claim with respect 
to insulation was abandoned during the trail in that 
the jury was not asked to make a finding thereon.· A 
prima facie case was never made with respect to the 
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claims regarding the sewer and insulation, for the 
reason that Respondents never produced any evidence 
of damage in connection therewith in that they failed 
to show the value of the property had it been as they 
claimed it was represented to be. Stuck v. Delta 
Land and Water Co., 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791. 
The case was tried on the basis of an alleged false 
representation concerning income. Therefore, Ap-
pellants' argument will be confined to the alleged 
representation concerning income. 
POINT II. RESPONDENTS DID NOT RELY 
UPON THE REP:J1ESENTA'TIONS 
CLAIMED. 
The Court instructed the jury that before the 
Respondents were 'entitled to recover upon their 
Counter Claim the jury must find from the evidence, 
among other things, that the Respondents relied upon 
the truth of the statements made(R. 25). No.inter-
rogatory was submitted to the jury on reliance, and 
no finding thereon was made by the Court. However, 
as we understand Rule No. 49, the Court is presumed 
to have made such a finding. Appellants contend 
that such finding, had one been made, is not supported 
by the evidence. While it is true Respondents stated 
on direct examination that they relied on the state-
ment of the Plaintiff, Clyde C. Lewis, that the pro-· 
perty had produced One Thousand and no/100 
( $1,000.00) Dollars per month, yet their testimony 
is no stronger than where it is left on cross examina-
tion. Oberg, v. Sapders, 111 Utah 507, 184 Pac, 2d 
229. 
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Appellants contend that the cross examination 
of the Respondent, Clara White, shows that they did 
not rely on the statement of Mr. Lewis as to the 
amount of income the property had produced, but 
that they relied upon his statement of how much in-
come they could make from the property. When be-
ing questioned about her statement that Mr. Lewis 
told her the property was bringing in One Thousand 
and no/100 ( $1,000.00) Dollars per month she said,. 
"I probably laughed at him" ( Tr.60). "I did not be-
lieve it till I was told over and over again" ( Tr. 60). 
And upon being pressed further she said: "I did be-
lieve it, I did believe I could make that much" ( Tr. 
61). This is further borne out by the following: , "I 
did not know whether he was telling me the truth or 
whether he was just kidding me about it. I did not 
know" ( Tr. 61 and 62). He pursuaded me that I 
could do that, so why did I refuse to believe it ... he 
knew I could make it, knew I would make it" (Tr. 
66). "The fact that I was told I would make $1,000.00 
certainly would persuade me." (Tr. 67.) 
POINT III RESPONDENTS HAD NO RIGHT 
TO RELY UPON THE REPRESEN-
TATIONS CLAIMED. 
If the Court for any reason is unable to accept 
Appellants' contention that Respondents did not in 
fact rely upon the representations, and believes that 
the evidence shows that they did so rely, the Appel-
lants earnestly con tend, in any event, the Respondents 
had no right to rely on said representations. 
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One of the essential elements of fraud is the right 
to rely upon- the representations. Stuck, vs. Delta 
Land and Water Company, 63 Utah 495,227 Pac.791. 
This Court stated in Johnson, vs. Allen, 108 Utah, 
148, 158 Pac. 2d 134 : 
"It is fundamental that before anyone can 
have relief from a claimed fraud he must show 
not only that he relied upon the misrepresenta-
tion, but also that he had a right to rely on it." 
The Court in the Stuck case, supra, also recognized 
that the following quotations from text writers state 
general rules with respect to right of reliance. The 
following is an excerpt from Black on Recession and 
Cancellation, Paragraph 113; found on page 796 of 
227 Pac.: 
''It is a rule of great antiquity, and supported 
by a great body of authorities, that a person 
about to enter into a contract or assume an obli-
gation should exercise reasonable care and pru-
dence in the matter of accepting at their face 
value representations concerning the subject-
matter made to him by the opposite party; and, 
although the representations were false and 
fraudulent, and he was deceived by them and 
misled to his injury, yet he cannot rescind or re-
pudiate his contract on that ground, if it appears 
that he might have discovered their falsity by 
mere inspection of the subject, or by the exercise 
of reasonable diligence in referring to sources of 
information which were equally open to him as 
to the other party.. There are exceptions to this 
rule: ... Where a fiduciary relationship subsist-
ed between the parties, where the matter was 
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exclusively \vi thin the knowledge of one of them, 
where an examination of the subject-matter 
would require unusual pains, expense or trouble, 
and involve special training or technical know-
ledge, and so on. But in the absence of such cir-
cumstances, the rule applies that, where the sub-
ject-matter of false representations is at hand, 
and the truth easily ascertainable, one cannot 
be heard to say that he had been defrauded by 
such representations if he neglected to avail him-
self of a present and reasonable opportunity to 
learn the truth." · 
On the same page this Court quoted from Pome-
roy's Equity Jurisprudence (3d Ed.) paragraph 892, 
as to when a person is, or is not, justified in reliance: 
" ( 1) When, before entering into the contract 
or other transaction, he actually resorts to the 
proper means of ascertaining the truth and veri-
fying the statement; (2) when, having the op-
portunity of making such examination, he is 
charged with knowledge which he necessarily 
would have obtained if he had prosecuted it with-
diligence; (3) when the representation is con-
cerning generalities equally within the knowl-
edge or means -of acquiring knowledge possessed 
by both parties; ( 4) but when the representa-
tions concerning facts of which the party mak-
ing it has, or is supposed to have, knowledge, and 
the other party has no such advantage, and the 
circumstances are not those described in the first 
or second case, then it will be presumed that he 
relied on the statement." _ 
The general rule is stated in an annotation in 
17 4 A. L. R. at Page 1038 as follows,: 
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"If a purchaser makes a personal investiga-
tion which is free and unhampered and condi--
tions are such that he must obtain the informa-
tion he desires, he is presumed to reply upon his 
own investigation rather than on representa-
tions made to him by his vendor." 
A leading case wherein application of the rules 
with respect to the right to rely upon representations 
was made is Carpenter, vs. Hamilton, 62 Pac. 2d 1397 
(Cal.) This was an action for fraud in the sale of 
real property. The Plaintiff had judgrrient in the· 
trial court which was reversed by the appellate court 
on the ground that Plaintiff had no right to rely on 
the alleged false representations. The following are 
quotations from the opinion : 
"But the right to rely upon the representa-
tions, of course, does not exist where a purchaser 
chooses to inspect the property before purchase, 
and, in making such inspection, learns the true 
facts, for the obvious reason that he has not been 
defrauded unless he has been misled, and he has 
not been misled where he has acted with· actual 
or imputed knowledge of the true facts. Ruhl, 
vs. Mott, 120 Cal. 668, 53 P. 304; Gratz vs. 
Schuler, 25 Cal. App. 117, 142 P. 899; Oppen-
heimer vs. Clunie, 142 Cal. 313, 75 P. 899. 
" ( 4-9) Upon the question of knowledge it is 
held, generally, that where one undertakes to 
investigate the property involved or the truth of 
the representations concerning it and proceeds 
with the investigation without hindrance it will 
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be considered that he went far enough with it 
to be satisfied 'Yith what he learned. Mr. Pom-
eroy says, in speaking of one who has under-
taken to make an inspection of the property, 
"The plainest motives of expediency and of jus-
tice require that he should be charged with all 
the knowledge which he might have obtained had 
he pursued the inquiry to the end with diligence 
and completeness. He cannot claim that he did 
not learn the truth, and that he was misled." 2 
Pomeory's Equity Jurisdprudence (3rd Ed.) 
paragraph 893. "One ground of this latter 
branch of the rule is the practical impossibility 
in any judicial proceeding of ascertaining exact-
ly how much knowledge the party obtained by 
his inquiry; and the opportunity which a con-
trary rule would give to a party of repudiating 
an agreement or other transaction fairly enter-
ed into, with which he had become dissatisfied." 
Id. If it fairly appears from the evidence that 
the buyer undertook to investigate for himself 
the matters as to which representations had been 
made, he cannot be allowed to later claim that he 
acted upon the representations, even though he 
voluntarily abandoned his investigation before 
it was completed." 
"But there is another reason why the charge 
of fraud must fail. Having inspected the prop-
erty to be purchased with ample time and oppor-
tunity to judge of its condition, they must be 
charged with knowledge of what they learned 
and what they would have learned in the exer-
cise of ordinary care and diligence. They may 
not deny knowledge of facts which would have 
been known to them but for their negligence. It 
is to be conceded that if they had made no exam-
ination of the property defendant could no.t ex-
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cuse his fraud by the plea that plaintiffs were 
negligent in believing what he said and in fail-
ing to make an independent investigation, but 
having undertaken the inquiry, plaintiffs were 
obliged to look with seeing eyes. When the in-
spection was over, they could not excuse their 
ignorance of what they should have seen by 
pleading the superficial character of their ex-
amination.'' 
"It might have caused Plaintiffs some incon-
venience to make an examination of the founda-
tion or of the roofs, or to em ploy some one to 
make the examination for them, but they could 
not otherwise have learned of the existing con-
ditions. The duty of a purchaser who has under-
taken to make an inspection is not limited to 
doing the things he m'ay find to be convenient. 
The difficulties which plaintiffs have pointed out, 
if they could be properly so called, were not such 
obstacles as would excuse them from making a 
complete investigation. All of the means of 
knowledge were at hand. The true condition of 
the buildings was before them. If they neglected 
to discover what was in plain sight, the law will 
nevertheless charge them with knowledge of 
what they should have discovered. They cannot 
deny knowledge of the patent defects which 
existed in the parts of the buildings which they 
did examine. Having knowledge of the falsity 
of some of the representations, they had no right 
to rely upon others. The rule is universally rec-
ognized in fraud cases that where the buyer is 
aware of suspicious circumstances or has learn-
ed of the falsity of one or more of the represen-
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tations he is under a legal duty to make a com-
plete investigation and may not rely upon the 
, statements of the seller." (Emphasis ours.) 
The Court held as a matter of law in the Car-
penter case, supra, that Plaintiff did not rely upon 
the representations. Appellants contend that the 
rules set out above are applicable to the case at bar 
and the Respondents in this case had no right to rely 
upon the representations claimed. 
Before the contract was executed Respondents 
went to the motel property upon two occasions, made 
an inspection of the same and made inquiry of Mr. 
Lyons who was in charge concerning the income. Mrs. 
White relates her conversation with Mr. Lyons as fol-
lows: "The income there at that time, he told me 
there was seven men there and that they were each 
paying two and a half a day" ( Tr. 50.). According 
to Mr. Lyons, he told her there were nine permanent 
guests paying $7.00 per week (Tr. 318). On a month-
ly basis the income, according to Mrs. White's testi-
mony, was $525.00, and according to Mr. Lyon's tes-
timony was $270.00. There is no evidence in the rec-
ord that Respondents made any other or further in-
quiry concerni_ng the income of the property. On the 
contrary, the evidence shows that the Respondents 
were most indifferent to the matter. They knew there 
was a receipt book, but they never asked to se it (Tr. 
74, 76). Thy knew a Miss Carruth had operated the 
property for a year prior to that time ( Tr. 50), but 
they never asked Mr. or Mrs. Lewis how to get in 
touch with Miss Carruth. They never inquired of 
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Mr. Lyons how to reach ·Miss Carruth ( Tr. 80). When 
asked by counsel if she was not interested in talking 
with Miss Carruth Mrs. White shrugged her 
shoulders and said: "I had no reason to talk to her." 
"I was not interested in asking her how much she 
made" ( Tr. 80). Respondents testified Mr. Lewis 
told them the place was producing One Thousand and 
noll 00 ( $1,000.00) Dollars per month, and that Miss 
Carruth had made One Thousand and no/100 
( $1,000.00) Dollars per month. Subsequent to this, 
however, Respondents made their own investigation 
of the matter and according to Respondents' evidence 
learned the property was producing a little over one-
half the amount represented. This is a clear case for 
application of the rule of the Carpenter case, supra. 
There is no evidence that Appellants used any ar-
tifice or deception or tried to conceal anything from 
the Respondents and there was no fiduciary relation 
between the parties. The Respondents were notre-
quired to make an investigation, but under all of the 
authorities, having chosen to inspect the property and 
make an investigation concering the income, they are 
charged with the knowledge of what they learned, 
and what they would have learned in the exercise of 
ordinary care and diligence, and should have made 
a complete investigation. 
As the Court observed in the Carpenter case, 
supra, if the Respondents undertook to investigate 
for themselves, and upon doing so obtained informa-
tion that the place was producing approximately half 
the amount they testified to having. been told it was 
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making, they can not be allowed to claim that they 
relied and acted upon the representations. Under 
the authorities cited such information which they did 
obtain, about the income, \vas such that they were 
under the legal duty to make a complete investigation 
and can not rely upon any of the statements of the 
Appellants. The facts in the case at bar "leads to a sin-
gle tenable conclusion" that the Respondents had no 
right to rely on the representations. The matter then 
becomes a question of law, as in the CarpeRter case, 
supra. Therefore the Court erred in denying Appel-
lants' motion for a directed verdict and the judgment 
of the trial court should be reversed. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON 
RIGHT TO RELY. 
That the right to rely on the representations is 
an essential element of fraud, has already been em-
phasized. Appellants have also urged that the evi-
dence that Respondents did not rely upon the repre-
sentations is so strong in this case as to require this 
Court, as a matter of law, to reverse the judgment 
of the trial Court. However, should the views of this 
court be at variance with those expressed herein, then 
Appellants conten-d that in any event it was prejudi-
cial error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the 
jury regarding the right to rely. 
:: The general rule, as supported by the case of 
~ Stanley Fruit Co. vs. Elery, 22 Pac. 2d 672 (Ariz.), 
~ is that when justified by the pleadings and. evi-
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dence instructions should be given concerning the 
right to rely. Respondents alleged in their Counter 
Claim that they relied upon the representations of 
the Appellants, which allegation was denied by Ap-
pellants in their Reply. As heretofore pointed out, 
the evidence so far as Appellants are concerned ad-
mits of only one conclusion, that is, that Respondents 
did not rely, or have the right to rely on the represen-
tations. However, should such view of the evidence 
not be accepted, wit~ such evidence as there is in the 
record on the question of reliance, the Trial Court 
certainly should have instructed the jury on the right 
to rely. Appellants requested the Court to so instruct 
the jury (Requested Instruction No. 3, R. 19) and 
Appellants properly took exception to the refusal of 
the Court to give such instruction (Tr. 408). Appel-
lants were prej:udiced thereby in that they were pre-
cluded from arguing this matter to the jury and the 
jury was deprived of the guidance of the Court's in-
- struction in making its determination of the issues 
presented. Such was prejudicial error, and there-
fore Appellants' motion for a new trial should have 
been gran ted. 
POINT V. THE FINDING OF THE JURY 
THAT THE VALUE OF THE MO-
TEL PROPERTY WAS $42,000.00, 
HAD IT BEEN AS REPRESENTED, 
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE. 
The Respondents called Lawrence M. Atwood, 
Thomas H. Heal and Ralph Halm, for the purpose 
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of proving value. In order to fix the value of the prop-
erty as it was at the time of purchase the witnesses 
were asked to assume that it had a gross income of 
Three Hundred Fifty and no/100 ( $350.00) Dollars 
per month, and based on that and their examination 
of the property they gave their opinion as to its value 
(Tr. 147, 171, 241), and the jury fixed the value at 
$14,000.00. Then the witnesses were asked to assume 
that the property had a gross income of $1,000.00 per 
month, and based upon that assumption they gave 
their opinion as to the value. The following is an ex-
cerpt from the testimony of Mr Heal: "Q. Now from 
your examination of this property, and assuming that 
on and just prior to May 1, 1949, the property was 
producing a gross income of approximately $350.00 a 
month, have you an opinion as to what would be, or 
what was the reasonable market value of that proper-
ty on May 1, 1949, including the furnishings in that 
property? A. Yes, sir. "Q. All right, what is your opin-
ion? A $14,166.00. ~'Q. Now assuming that the prop-
erty on May 1, 1949, was producing an income of 
$1,000.00 per month, have you an opinion as to what 
would be the reasonable market value of that property 
as of May 1, 1949, with such an income as $1,000.00 
per month?" To which the witness answered 
$42,500.00 (Tr. 171, 172). 
The same pattern was followed in the case of 
Mr. Atwood ( Tr. 148) and Mr. Halm ( Tr. 242). 
Upon that evidence the jury found the property 
would have had a value of $42,000.00 were the income 
as Respondents claimed it had been represented to 
be. Appellants contend such a finding is not sup-
ported by the evidence. 
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The witnesses were not askedto consider the ele-
ments of sewage and insulation in determining the 
value of the property as represented. The question 
put to them in each case was based on the assump-
tion of one thing only, that is, the gross inco~e of 
$1,000.00 per month. In other words, they were ask-
ed to fix value by capitalizing the gross income. This 
is an improper method of determining the value of 
property. One of the best authorities in support of 
this point is the case of DeFreitas, vs. Town of Sui-
sun, 149 Pac. 553 (Cal.). This was an action for 
damages to real property occasioned by reason of 
the fact that the Defendant had dug a tunnel, thereby 
diverting underground water which supplied Plain-
tiffs' springs and caused the same to become dry, 
thereby depriving Plaintiffs of the water belonging 
to their land. The jury brought in a verdict for the 
Plaintiffs for the sum of $4,000.00 damages. The fol-
lowing question was put to one of the witnesses: 
"Conceding that the town of Suisun dug the 
tunnel and struck the main flow of water at the 
end of the tunnel about the 8th of September, 
1908; that prior to that date there were springs 
on plantiffs' land, the waters of which, plantiff 
had used to irrigate a part of the land; that by 
reason of such irrigation, Mr. Freitas could 
and did cultivate strawberries, blackberries, 
raspberries and vegetables on that part of said 
land; that Mr. Freitas took off and received 
therefrom a gross income of $1,200 a year, aver-
age, and from the unirriga ted portions thereof 
a gross average· income of $600, and taking into 
consideration that this was outside of the ques-
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tion of having a living from the place, using 
'Yhat 'Yas there-now, under these circum-
stances, 'Yhat would have been in your estimate, 
the v-alue of that whole piece of property, the 
50 acres, giving the value of the irrigated and 
the unirrigated ground separately?" 
To this the 'vi tness answered : 
"Well, from grounds that produced a gross 
income of $1,200 a year I should say from 
$8,000 to $10,000; the balance producing a 
gross income of $600 I should say it would be 
worth from $4,000 to $5,000." 
"The witness was then asked what the dam-
age would be to the land if the town tunnel had 
dried up the springs formerly supplying Freitas' 
land, and permanently deprived it of the use of 
all that water for irrigating purposes, whereby 
the gross annual income of that irrigated land 
had been reduced to $200.00. The witness an-
swered that the loss would be from $6,000 to 
$8,000. On cross-examination the witness stated 
that he based his estimates of value on gross in-
come, deducting one-half for expenses of pro-
duction and allowing 6 per centum interest on 
the investment. In other words, he capitalized 
the gross income of $1,200, less one-half for ex-
penditures. He also testified that he knew noth-
ing of the actual yield of the land or of the ex-
penses of growing, harvesting, and marketing 
the crops produced from it. The defendant 
moved to strike out all the testimony of Gordon 
as to value and damage on the ground that he 
was not qualified to speak as an expert on the 
value of the Freitas place. The motion was de-
nied. 
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"The facts stated in the question gave no pro-
per basis for an estimate of value. Gross income 
does not determine value. It might be all used 
up in expenses, in which case upon the theory 
proposed, the land would be worthless, although 
its actual market value might be considerable. 
The witness had no knowledge of the expenses 
of production. His allowance of one-half was 
purely arbitrary, and there was no evidence to 
sustain it. Other evidence produced in defense 
tended to show that such expense was far more 
than one-half of the gross receipts. Moreover, 
if it were the law that the value is to be ascer-
tained by the mere capitalization of the net rev-
enue, the evidence should be confined to proof 
of facts showing the net revenue. That being 
ascertained, the value would not be a question 
for an expert, but a mere question of mathe-
matics, a calculation which the court should 
make or direct the jury to make. The truth is 
the amount of actual net revenue does not de-
termine the value of land in every case. The rev-
enue would vary according to the industry, 
skill, and wisdom of the person cultivating the 
land. Its net revenue, assuming reasonable skill 
in cultivation and management, would be the 
criterion, so far as that element alone is con-
cerned. But other elements, such as the state 
of the market, the demand and supply of land 
of the character in question, the prospects of ad-
vance, and perhaps other things, would ordin-
arily affect the question of value and- fix it at a 
sum different from that produced by capitaliza-
tjon of net revenue. The actual market value is 
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the thing to be determined, and while net rev-
enue should be considered, it does not, in general 
furnish a conclusive measure of such market 
value. In the present case, however, the ques-
tions, both as to value and damage, were framed 
upon the erroneous theory that value may be de-
tern1ined from gross revenue alone, and neither 
of them should have been allowed." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
The principle of the DeFreitas case (supra) was 
the basis of the holding in Revis, vs. Chapman & Co., · 
19 Pac. 2d 511 (Cal.). 
This principle is further supported by practi-
cally unanimous authority in condemnation cases. 
The author of the annotation in 7 A. L.- R. 163, 164, 
says: 
"Evidence of profits of a business conducted 
on property is too speculative, uncertain andre-
mote to be considered as a basis for computing 
or ascertaining market value of the property in 
condemnation proceedings.'' 
The following is also a statement from Jones on 
Evidence, Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged, 
Vol. 2, Page 1311: 
"The authorities are practically unanimous 
in this country to the effect that evidence of prof-
its derived from a business conducted on prop-
erty which is sought to be condemned is too 
speculative, uncertain and remote to be con-
sidered as a basis for computing or ascertaining 
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the market value of property within the intent 
and purpose of such proceedings." 
There is no reason why the rule in condemnation 
cases should be any different from the case at bar. 
The objections to the m.ethod of fixing value, as 
pointed out in the above authorities, are applicable 
to the case at bar. There is no evidence in the rec-
ord of the cost of operation to produce the income of 
$1,000.00 per month. As pointed out in the DeFrei-
tas case, supra, it might all be used up in expenses. 
·The revenue would vary according to the industry, 
skill and wisdom of the person operating the motel. 
Likewise, other things such as the state of the market, 
supply and demand would enter in, so that according 
to the DeFreitas case, neither gross nor net income is 
sufficient upon which to fix value. 
The witnesses Atwood and Heal arrived at the 
figure of $42,500.00 on the theory that the market 
value of the property increased in direct proportion 
to the increase of gross income (Tr. 148, 194, 195). 
Mr. Halm followed this same formula, except that 
he made some allowance for the type of construction 
( Tr. 241). It is obvious that such a method of ar-
riving at value is fallactious. This can be illustrated 
by the following example: Suppose two motels, with 
the same ·size and number of rooms, were built side 
by side at the same time. One was built of cheap ma-
terial, at a cost of $14,000.00 and the other of fine 
materials, at a cost of $42,000.00. The gross income 
from the cheap motel was about one-third that of 
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the better motel. Then suppose the management of 
the cheap motel changed its policy, put on an exten-
sive advertising can1 paign and furnished a floor show 
for the guests each night, and by doing so increased 
the gross income so that it was equal to that of the 
better motel. It "·ould be absurd to say that by doing 
so the market value of the cheap motel had been in-
creased to equal that of the better motel. 
This Court has announced that the measure of 
damages in fraud cases in this State is the so-called 
"benefit of the bargain" rule. Hecht, vs. Metzler, 14 
Utah 408, 48 Pac. 37; Kinnear, vs. Prows, 81 Utah 
135, 16 Pac. 2d 1094, which is, that the injured per-
son is allowed the difference between the actual value 
of the property and its value if it had been as repre-
sented. This rule is fairly simple of application when 
some tangible aspect of the property is involved. To 
illustrate, if the motel had been represented to have 
a copper lifetime roof, and it actually had a tar paper 
roof, the difference in value could be readily ascer-
tained. In such case there would be a variation in 
the structure itself, and its value would be one figure 
with one type of roof and another figure with the 
other type of roof. But the inapplicability of such 
measure of damages is obvious when the variation is 
not in the structure of the property itself, but in the 
gross income only. Where the gross income alon'e is 
varied there is no variation in the structure itself. 
Without a variation in the structure it is difficult to 
see how there can be any variation in its market 
value. 
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In the final analysis there is no question but 
what the Respondents got the exact property which 
they inspected and which was the subject of the con-
tract between the parties. If the property had had 
a gross income of $1,000.00 per month it would still 
have been identically the same property, and its value 
no different. Appellants contend therefore that the 
finding of the jury of $42,000.00 as the value of the 
property had it been as represented is not supported 
by the evidence; that the measure of damages used 
is not applicable and that Respondents have shown 
no damage and therefore App_ellants' Motion for a 
directed verdict should have been granted. 
POINT VI. RESPONDENTS WAIVED ANY 
ACTION FOR FRAUD. 
- The undisputed evidence in this case which came 
from the Respondents themselves, to which no ob-
jection was made, shows that Respondents have 
waived a right of action for fraud. Respondents took 
possession of the property on May 1, 1949'(Tr. 322). 
During the year following some money was paid on 
the contract by Respondents, but Respondents got 
behind in their payments and a notice of eviction was 
served. upon them ( Tr. 116) . Thereafter negotia-
tions were had between the parties and their attor-
neys for the purpose of permitting the Respondents 
to remain in possession of and pay for the property. 
Mrs. White testified: "I went to the office (Mr. Jen-
sen's) and tried to fix things with him and let me 
have a chance to pay up" ( Tr. 107) . "I tried to get 
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him (Mr.Jensen) toletmepayitthatway" ($100.00 
a week Tr. 108). On redirect examination, and in 
response to a question by her attorney, Mrs. White 
testified about the conversation with respect to pay-
ing $100.00 a week as follows: "It was after I got 
the notice of eviction and I went down to Salt Lake 
a purpose to see Mr. Jensen or Mr. Lewis, whichever 
I could see. I saw Mr. Jensen and I tried to talk to 
him, get him to do something, give me some way of 
paying that so that I could wait until I got my house 
full enough. The boys were coming back I was told 
and I tried to get him to wait." 
After these negotiations Mrs. White raised the 
sum of $1,694.14 and through her attorney, Mr. Dal-
ton, paid that sum to Appellants, which was accepted 
by the Appellants through their attorney for the pur-
pose of reinstating the contract. On June 12, 1950, 
a receipt was issued by Mr. Jensen, attorney for Ap-
pellants, for said sum, which recites as follows: "Re-
instatement of contract of Clara A. White and 
Kathryn Grange White with Clyde C. Lewis, for pur-
chase of motel at Pleasant Grove." (Defendants' Ex-
hibit 3). 
At the time of these negotiations and reinstate-
ment of the contract Respondents had been in pos-
session of the property for more than a year. The 
evidence shows that they took in about $130.00 from 
transients during the first year, and that they had 
an average of four roomers who paid $10.00 per week 
each for a room ( Tr. 54-55) . Their gross income 
from the property other than from board furnished 
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to some roomers, was less than $200.00 per month. 
It is obvious that from the first month they were in 
possession they knew the alleged representations re-
garding income were false. Likewise Respondents 
claimed to have had trouble with the sewer com-
mencing with the day after they moved in ( Tr. 305). 
If the place was not well insulated it was quite un-
likely they could have lived in the premises for a year, 
especially during the winter, without becoming 
aware of the lack of insulation. If there were any 
false representations made Respondents had dis-
covered the falsity thereof before the negotiations for, 
and ultimate reinstatement of the contract. 
As to the timeliness of the discovery of fraud in 
a case much like the one at bar, in that it involved 
representations of the income of a hotel, is the lead-
ing case of Schmidt, vs. Mesmer, 48 Pac. 54 (Cal.), 
which will be referred to hereafter, wherein the 
Court said: 
"The Appellants took possession of the prem-
ises on the first of January, 1894; and, if the 
Respondents made the representation alleged, 
the falsity of that representation must have been 
discovered ... immediately after the Plaintiffs 
took possession." 
The authorities sustain the proposition that the ne-
gotiations set out above and reinstatement of the con-
tract after Respondents had discovered the alleged 
fraud, amount to a waiver thereof. As mentioned 
above, one of the leading cases which is very similar 
to the case at bar in support of this proposition is 
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Schmidt, vs. Mesmer, supra. The gist of the Com-
plaint 'vas that the Defendant had falsely represent-
ed the income of the hotel for the previous year to be 
$750.00 per month, whereas in truth it was. only 
$350.00 per month. The Court stated the rule as fol-
lo\YS: 
"If, after his knowledge of what he claims to 
have been the fraud, he elects not to rescind, but 
to adopt the contract and sue for damages, he 
must stand toward the other party at arm's 
length; he must, on his part, comply with the 
terms of the contract; he must not ask favors of 
the other party, or offer to perform the contract 
on conditions which he has no right to exact, 
and must not make any new agreement or en-
gagement representing it; otherwise he waives 
the alleged fraud.'' 
Mter citing several authorities the Court concluded 
as follows: 
"Under the foregoing authorities, and upon 
principle, we think that the acts of the appel-
lants in the case at bar constitute a waiver of 
the alleged fraud, and an abandonment of the 
suit for damages. After the expiration of more 
than a year subsequent to their know ledge of 
the alleged fraud, they ask to have the rent re-
duced, without any intimation of the alleged 
fraudulent conduct of the respondent. Subse-
quent to that time they solicited and obtained an 
extension of the time for the payment of the rent, 
still without any intimation of the alleged fraud; 
and they themselves have failed to comply with 
their part of the contract, by failing to pay the 
rent as provided therein. This conduct of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
appellants clearly brings them within the prin-
cii?le d~clared in the authorities above cited, and, 
this being so, the alleged errors of the court, with 
respect to other matters, become immaterial." 
The Court held in the case of Hough, vs. Fer-
guson, 171 Pac. 804 (Cal.) that where the Defend-
ants lived on the property for many months, and 
being in default in their payments on the mortgage, 
applied to the Plaintiffs for, and received extensions 
of time on such payments, that by doing so, after they 
had knowledge of the alleged falsity of the represen-
tations, they were precluded from later raising the 
question of fraud. 
The California courts have continuously affirm-
ed the doctrine of Schmidt, vs. Mesmer. In the case 
of Tucker, vs. Beneke, 182 Pac. 299 (Cal.) it was 
held that a request for and obtaining of an extensiori 
of time on the mortgage amounted to a waiver of 
fraud under the case of Schmidt, vs. Mesmer. A simi-
lar case is that of Monahan, vs. Watson, 214 Pac. 
1001 (Cal.). This was an action on a promissory note 
given in payment of personal property. The s~ller 
and holder of the note instructed his attorney to col-
lect it upon maturity. Three or four days before the 
due date the Buyer called at the attorney's office and 
requested an extension of time for thirty days, which 
was granted by the attorney. It was held that such 
was a waiver of alleged fraud in the sale of the prop-
erty for which the note had been given. The Court 
cited Schmidt, vs. Mesmer. -
Another case where the facts are similar to the 
case at bar is Tuttle, vs. Stovall, 67 S. E. 806 (Ga.). 
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In this case the plaintiff had purchased from the De-
fendants some furniture which had been used by De-
fendants in the operation of a hotel. The contract 
price was $2,125.00; $700.00 of which was paid in 
cash at the time of the execution of the contract and 
notes taken for the balance. One note for $500.00, 
due on Septem.ber 5, 1908, was paid at about that 
time. Another note for $500.00 was due on-January 
5, 1909. On January 8, 1909, the Plaintiff paid 
$200.00 on the latter note and took from the Defend-
ant a writing acknowledging receipt of the note 
agreeing "to indulge her for thirty days to pay the 
balance of the note." The Plaintiff claimed that the 
Defendant had misrepresented the income of the ho-
tel, that he had represented such income to be $600.00 
or $700.00 per month gross, with net profits of from 
$100.00 to $150.00 per month. Plaintiff claimed 
these representations were false in that the books of 
the Defendant showed gross receipts of $400.00 per 
month and that the hotel had been operating at a loss 
of $75.00 to $90.00 per month. The Plaintiff sought 
and obtained in the trial Court an order enjoining 
the Defendant from collecting said notes on the 
ground of fraud. The Appellate Court, however, re-
versed the lower court on the ground that the Plain-
tiff had waived the fraud. In discussing waiver the 
Court says on Page 809 : 
"Conceding that Mrs. Stovall was induced to 
enter into the contract by reason of fraud per-
petrated upon her by Tuttle, we think by her 
conduct she waived the fraud and could not set 
the same up to recover damages against Tuttle 
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at the time she filed her petition. With knowl-
edge that the representations were false, she 
paid one of the purchase-money notes for 
$500.00 on September 5, 1908, and on January 
8, 1909, she paid $200.00 on another note due 
January 5, 1909, and took from Tuttle a writ-
ing signed by him acknowledging receipt of the 
$200.00 and agreeing "to indulge her for thirty ' 
days to pay the balance of the note." With full 
kn9wledge of the fraud, and thereafter paying 
$200.00, and obtaining from the vendor a writ-
ing signed by him agreeing to give her 30 days 
within which to pay the balance due on the ma-
tured note, she claims she is not due the balance 
on this note on account of the fraud of Tuttle 
which induced her to sign it. By this conduct 
she waived the alleged fraud, and cannot now set 
it up to prevent the collection of the note. If she 
waived the fraud in regard to the balance due on 
this note, she waived it as to all the other notes, 
as the alleged fraud related to one note as well as 
the other. She seeks to prevent the collection of 
the balance due on this note, as well as to prevent 
the collection of the other note. When. with 
· knowledge that the representations inducing 
her to give the notes were false, she induced the 
vendor, by paying him $200.00, to agree to give 
her more time than she had under the original 
contract to pay the balance, she condoned the 
fraud. After the discovery of the fraud, she 
could not have treated the contr-act as a valid one 
and procured favors from the other party with 
respect thereto without her conduct being con-
strued as an acquiescence in the contract as made 
with the fraud in it. By her conduct in thus 
dealing with the opposite party she· recognized 
the contract as one that was valid and enforce-
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able against her in its entirety. By making the 
payments and obtaining from the other party a 
writing w·herein he promised to wait on her for 
payments longer than was stipulated in the orig-
inal contract, she made an admission that the 
contract w·as valid, which is inconsistent with 
her statements that it vvas tainted with fraud. 
She impliedly promised to pay the balance of the 
note at the expiration of the 30 days, and she 
distinctly recognized her liability on the note, 
which is inconsistent with the idea that she was 
not liable for such balance because of fraud in 
the procurement of the note forming part of the 
contract. If she did not expect to pay it, she 
should not have dealt with it as if she did owe it, 
and should not have procured the other party to 
agree to something not in the original contract 
and induced him to believe that she did not con-
sider that there was any fraud in the contract, 
or, if there was that she would make no defense 
to the collection on that ground. To do this, and 
then avoid payment of the balance of the note, 
would be a fraud on the. other party, and one 
fraud will not justify another fraud. Her pay-
ment of $200, and the obtaining from the other 
party a writing wherein he promised to give her 
time beyond that provided for in the original con-
tract, was in contradiction of her purpose to sue 
for damages for fraud in the procurement of the 
notes; and, if there was fraud in the contract, 
this conduct was an adoption of it as it existed 
with the fraud in it. By her conduct she condon-
ed the fraud, and, like the ratification of the un-
authorized acts of an agent, such conduct relates 
to the time of the formation of the contract, con-
firming it from its date and purging it of its 
fraud." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
84 
A recent Federal case followed this line of au-
thority is Phillips Petroleum Company, vs. Rau Con-
struction Company, 130 Fed. 2d 499,502. The fol-
lowing statement is made by the Court: 
"The authorities are unanimous in holding 
that where one has been induced by fraud to 
enter into a contract, and after discovery of the 
fraud enters into an agreement concerning the 
subject matter of the contract, or demands and 
receives from the other party any substantial 
concession in respect to the contract, he is con-
clusively deemed to have waived any claim for 
damages on account of fraud. Josten Manufact-
uring Company, vs. Medical Arts Building Com-
pany, 8 Cir. 73Fed. 2d 259; International .Har-
vester Company, vs. Rieke, 8 Cir. 9 Fed. 2d 776; 
Schagun, vs. Scott Manufacturing Company, 8 
Cir, 162 Fed. 209; State Ex Rei Cary, vs. 
Trimble, Mo. Sup. 43 S. W. 2d 1050; Holcomb & 
H. Manufacturing Co. vs. Jones, 102 Okla. 175, 
228 Pac. 968; Minneapolis~ Moline Company, vs. 
Gatzki, Tex. Civ. App., 57 S. W. 2d 593; Thomp-
son, vs. Pitts, Tex. Civ. App. 2 S. W. 2d 899." 
In an annotation on this subject at 106 A. L. R. 
172, at page 177, the author says: 
"In the ordinary case where the seller grants 
an extension of time within which the buyer may 
pay for property, and the buyer, whether with or 
without the giving of renewal notes, or any notes 
at all, accepts such extension with knowledge of 
the seller's antecedent fraud in the transaction, 
it is held that the buyer waives all claim to dam-
ages for such fraud." 
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Some of the cases herein set forth are cited in support · 
of that statement. The author of the annotation also 
says on page 173 : 
"It is the general rule that if one induced by 
:q1isrepresentations or fraud to purchase, or to 
enter into a contract for the purchase of, prop-
erty, thereafter, with knowledge of the decep-
tion, receives from the seller some substantial 
consession or enters into a new contract in re-
spect of the transaction, he thereby relinquishes 
all right to recover or recoup damages because 
of the misrepresentations." · 
This proposition is am ply supported by au thori-
ties from many jurisdictions. 
The record in this case shows that after Respon-
dents had been in possession of the property for about 
a year and knew of the alleged fraud they became in 
default in their payments on the contract, were about 
to lose the property and a notice of eviction had been 
served upon them. With the matter in such a status 
they requested the right to reinstate the contract by 
bringing the delinquent payments up to date by pay-
ing $100.00 per week. It is undisputed that after such 
request was made Respondents raised a sum in excess 
of $1600.00 w~ich was tendered to Appellants, and 
accepted by Appellants, and the contract was rein-
stated by Appellants. It is of interest to note that the 
Respondents were represented by counsel at the time 
and the reinstatement of the contract was handled by 
the attorney for Respondents. It is also significant 
that the record shows no complaint of fraud having 
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been made either by Respondents or their attorney 
prior to, during these negotiations or thereafter until 
they were sued. Under the authorities cited above 
the Respondents have waived any alleged fraud. Re-
instatement of the contract is a stronger circum-
stance indcating waiver than merely obtaining an 
extension of time, and in any event falls well within 
the doctrine of Schmidt, vs. Mesmer and the other 
cases cited. 
It is recognized that waiver is an affirmative 
defense, that it was not pleaded and that no motion, 
was made to amend the pleadings to set up the waiver. 
However, Appellants contend that under Rule 15 (b), _ 
waiver is an issue now before this Court. The per-
tinent portion of the rule reads as follows: 
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, 
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment 
of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause 
them to conform to the evidence and to raise 
these issues may be made upon motion of any 
party at any time, even after judgment; but fail-
ure so to amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues." 
It has already been pointed out that the evidence 
of waiver was admitted without objection and in fact 
most of it was brought out by counsel for Respon-
dents. This being true Respondents are deemed to 
have consented to introduction of the issue of waiver 
in this case. Globe Liquor Co. vs. San Roman, C. C. A. 
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7th, 1947, 160 F 2d 800. eontinental Illinois National 
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, vs. Ehrhart, C. C. A. 
6th, 1942, 127 F. 2d 341. 
Under the above rule Appellants contend the is-
sue is now before this Court without amendment. 
This rule has been construed in the Federal Courts. 
In the case of Fifth Avenue Bank of New York, vs. 
Hamond Realty Co., C. C. A. 7th, 1942, 130 F. 2d 993, 
certiorari denied 63 S. Ct. 666, 318 U. S. 765, 87 L. 
Ed. 1136, it was held that on appeal the pleadings 
would be deemed amended to meet the proof. The 
Court in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. vs. Rhine, C. C. A. 5th 
1945, 152 F. 2d 368, ~eld that on appeal evidence ra-
ther than pleading would be regarded. Likewise it 
was held in Katz Drug Co. vs. Katz, D. C. Mo. 1950, . 
89 F. Supp. 528, that the issue of laches though not 
pleaded would be treated as if properly raised where 
evidence in the record clearly established such a de-
fense. 
However, if the Court believes that an amend-
ment should be made Appellants request that they be 
permitted to do so. An amedment can be made after 
the case has reached the appellate court. In Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, vs. Siraco, C. C. A. 
2d 17 4 Fed. 2d 360, the Court remanded the case with 
instructions to allow the reply to be amended to per-
mit plea of payment and to permit the depositor to 
put in answering pro~f. 
The evidence of waiver is undisputed and came 
from the Respondents themselves. The law applic-
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able thereto clearly establishes that Respondents have 
waived the fraud complaint of. Therefore the judg-
ment of the trail Court should be reversed and judg-
ment for no cause of action be entered on Respon-
dents' Counter Claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants recoginze that Respondents testi-
fied as to the alleged representations. Such testi-
. mony was vigorously denied by Appellants in the 
trial, and Appellants now maintain that no -such re-
presentations were made by them. In any event, Ap-
pellants contend in this appeal that such representa-
tions were not relied upon by Respondents. Likewise 
Appellants contend that Respondents have failed to 
prove any damage by reason of the representations 
claimed, and finally Appellants maintain Respon-
dents have waived any action for the fraud claimed. 
Therefore Judgment of the trial Court should be re-
versed and the Counter Claim of Respondents should 
be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PERRIS S. JENSEN 
GLEN Y. RICHARDS 
HAROLD R. BOYER 
OF ROMNEY, BOYER~ BERTOCH 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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